

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 05101 01 OF 02 051803Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----127917 051821Z /41
P 051738Z APR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8024
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 05101

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XDGS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF POST- LENARY DISCUSSIONS WITH
ACADEMICIAN SHCHUKIN REGARDING CRUISE MISSILE
RANGE, MARCH 23 AND MARCH 30, 1978
(SALT TWO-1659)

REF: A. MEMCON A-2099, DTD 23 MAR 78; B. MEMCON A-2108,
DTD 30 MAR 78

IMPORTANCE OF 600 KM LIMIT

1. IN POST-PLENARY BILATERAL WITH PEREZ AND FREW ON
MARCH 23, SHCHUKIN EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN OVER
MANNER IN WHICH DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE WOULD
APPLY TO 600 KM (VICE 2500 KM) LIMIT. HE POINTED OUT
THAT, UNDER U.S. DEFINITION, CRUISE MISSILES WHICH WOULD
BE CONSIDERED TO HAVE A RANGE LESS THAN 600 KM COULD, IN
FACT, FLY FURTHER THAN 600 KM. HE ADDED THAT, SINCE SUCH
MISSILES WOULD BE UNCONSTRAINED BY THE AGREEMENT (I.E.,
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 05101 01 OF 02 051803Z

THEY COULD BE DEPLOYED IN UNLIMITED QUANTITIES "ON ANY
SHIP, AIRCRAFT, OR OTHER PLATFORM") THIS COULD LEAD TO
POSSIBILITY OF A SIDE HAVING A "GREAT NUMBER" OF MISSILES
WHICH COULD REACH TARGETS BEYOND 600 KM. FOR THIS REASON
HE BELIEVED THAT CRUISE MISSILE RANGE DEFINITION SHOULD
BE PARTICULARLY RESTRICTIVE AT 600 KM LEVEL.

2. TO ILLUSTRATE HIS POINT, SHCHUKIN DREW A DIAGRAM IN WHICH TWO SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WERE DIRECTED AT COASTAL TARGETS. IN FIRST CASE THE MISSILE HAD NO OBSTACLES OR DEFENSES TO OVERCOME AND COULD FLY A STRAIGHT LINE TO ITS TARGET. IN SECOND CASE THERE WAS AN OBSTACLE, SUCH AS A SHIP OR PLANE, AND ALTHOUGH THE STRAIGHT LINE DISTANCE TO THE TARGET WOULD STILL BE 600 KM THE MISSILE WOULD BE FORCED TO FLY A GREATER DISTANCE, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 1000 KM, TO REACH ITS TARGET. THEREFORE, HYPOTHETICALLY, THE SECOND MISSILE, IN THE ABSENCE OF DEFENSES, COULD REACH A COASTAL TARGET WHICH WAS 1000 KM AWAY.

3. FREW NOTED THAT IF THE FIRST MISSILE WERE DESIGNED TO USE HIGH SPEED AND LOW ALTITUDE FLIGHT TO COUNTER DEFENSES, IT TOO COULD BE MADE TO FLY FURTHER AGAINST UNDEFENDED TARGETS BY LOWERING ITS SPEED AND/OR CHANGING ITS ALTITUDE. THIS WAS SOMETHING THE U.S. SIDE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND; HOW COULD THE SOVIET SIDE ACCEPT THIS SITUATION BUT NOT THE SECOND SITUATION DESCRIBED BY SHCHUKIN?

4. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DESIGN AN UNMANNED MISSILE WHICH COULD CHANGE ITS SPEED OR PROFILE SIGNIFICANTLY. HENCE, A REAL CRUISE MISSILE, HE WAS CERTAIN, WOULD HAVE A NARROW RANGE OF SPEED AND PROFILE. FREW DID NOT AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DESIGN A CRUISE MISSILE WHICH COULD
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 05101 01 OF 02 051803Z

CHANGE ITS SPEED AND ALTITUDE.
STRATEGIC VICE TACTICAL CRUISE MISSILES

5. FREW ALSO NOTED THAT, ALTHOUGH A CRUISE MISSILE MIGHT FLY A GREATER DISTANCE IN A STRAIGHT LINE, IT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY ENGAGE A TARGET AT THAT GREATER DISTANCE.

6. SHCHUKIN RESPONDED THAT WE ARE SPEAKING OF CRUISE MISSILES IN A GENERAL SENSE, NOT JUST OF CRUISE MISSILES ATTACKING MOVING TARGETS. WE ARE SPEAKING OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THEREFORE WE SPOKE PRIMARILY OF FIXED TARGETS OR TARGETS WHICH MOVED INCOMPARABLY SLOWER THAN THE SPEED OF THE CRUISE MISSILE. FOR EXAMPLE, HE DID NOT CONSIDER CRUISE MISSILES DESIGNED FOR ATTACKING SHIPS TO BE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THESE WERE TACTICAL AND NOT STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE SAME WAS TRUE FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT CRUISE MISSILES.

7. FREW NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE RANGE DEFINITION DID NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES.

8. SHCHUKIN SAID PERHAPS THIS WAS THE CAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SIDES. THE SOVIET SIDE SAW STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS AS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED AT THOSE ARMS WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO STRIKE STRATEGIC TARGETS, I.E., POINT TARGETS, SUCH AS CITIES OR INDUSTRIAL CENTERS. AND THE SOVIET SIDE WAS NOT SPEAKING OF ANTI-SHIP OR ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS. THESE WERE NOT SUBJECTS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

9. FREW RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS PRECISELY OUR PROBLEM. THE SOVIET RANGE DEFINITION WOULD INCLUDE WEAPONS WHICH WERE DESIGNED FOR TACTICAL MISSIONS. THIS PRECISELY, WAS OUR CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE AS IT APPLIES TO THE 600 KM LIMIT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 GENEVA 05101 01 OF 02 051803Z

10. PEREZ WANTED TO PURSUE THIS POINT. IF A TARGET WERE

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 05101 02 OF 02 051809Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00
DODE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----128017 051822Z /41

P 051738Z APR 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8025
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 05101

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

400 KM AWAY AND IT WERE MOVING, SUCH AS A SURFACE SHIP, THEN, A MISSILE DESIGNED TO ATTACK SUCH A TARGET WOULD NOT BE A STRATEGIC WEAPON.

11. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IF WE WERE REALLY APPROACHING AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SCORE, IT COULD BE VERY IMPORTANT. IN HIS SKETCH HE HAD PURPOSELY DRAWN A SHORELINE SINCE IN THAT CASE THE TARGET COULD BE A CITY, A MILITARY BASE, OR A FACTORY. BUT THESE TARGETS WERE ON SHORE AND COULD NOT MOVE. IT FOLLOWED THAT THE SOVIET DEFINITION WAS NOT INTENDED TO CONSIDER THE MOVEMENT OF STRATEGIC TARGETS. HE RECALLED THAT WHEN THE SIDES HAD SPOKEN OF THE RANGE OF AN ICBM IT WAS NOT BY CHANCE THAT THIS RANGE WAS DEFINED AS THE SHORTEST DISTANCE BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC POINTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR, SINCE WE SPOKE OF STRIKING STATIONARY OBJECTS. SO, IF THE U.S. SIDE CONSIDERED AS STRATEGIC THOSE CRUISE MISSILES WHICH WERE NOT DESIGNED TO STRIKE SHIPS OR OTHER MOVING TARGETS, THEN PERHAPS THE ANSWER WOULD LIE IN CONCENTRATING ATTENTION ON STATIONARY, LAND-BASED TARGETS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 05101 02 OF 02 051809Z

12. PEREZ SAID THAT THIS WAS TRUE BUT THAT OUR CONCERN WITH THE SOVIET DEFINITION WAS THAT IT WOULD AFFECT CERTAIN TACTICAL CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEMS IN A WAY WHICH WAS NOT CONNECTED WITH THE TARGETS THEY WERE DESIGNED TO STRIKE BUT RATHER WITH THE WAY THE MISSILES FLEW. PERHAPS A CRUISE MISSILE COULD FLY 650 KM, BUT COULD ONLY EFFECTIVELY ATTACK A TARGET AT 400 KM.

13. SHCHUKIN REPEATED THAT IN FORMULATING THE SOVIET DEFINITION, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDED FROM THE PREMISE THAT CRUISE MISSILES WERE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WERE DESIGNED TO STRIKE STRATEGIC TARGETS. IF THE DIFFICULTY WITH THE SOVIET DEFINITION WAS IN CONNECTION WITH THOSE CRUISE MISSILES WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO STRIKE MOVING TARGETS PERHAPS THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN IN TERMS OF NOT LIMITING THEIR RANGE TOO STRICTLY.

14. FOLLOWING FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ANTI-SHIP MISSILES, SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT WE WERE AGAIN SPEAKING OF MOVING TARGETS. HE BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO SPEAK OF STRATEGIC TARGETS. HOWEVER, HE WAS READY TO EXAMINE HOW MUCH RANGE WOULD BE AFFECTED IF ONE WERE TO ATTACK A SHIP. HE DID WANT IT KEPT IN MIND, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET DEFINITION ASSUMED LAND-BASED STRATEGIC TARGETS. HE COULD ONLY ADD THAT ADDITIONAL FACTORS, SUCH AS AVOIDANCE OF AIR DEFENSES, WERE NOT CONSIDERED IN THE SOVIET DEFINITION. THE SOVIET SIDE SPOKE OF THE RANGE BETWEEN THE LAUNCH-POINT AND THE TARGET, SINCE ABM OR ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES COULD BE STRONGER, WEAKER, OR ABSENT. IT WOULD BE UNFOUNDED TO CONSIDER THESE IN DEFINING RANGE SINCE RANGE WOULD THEN BECOME ABSOLUTELY UNCLEAR.

15. LATER, FOLLOWING A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF TOMAHAWK AND
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 05101 02 OF 02 051809Z

TERCOM GUIDANCE, SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IT SEEMED VERY
IMPORTANT TO HIM FOR THE SIDES TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE
SOVIET SIDE IS SPEAKING OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE CONTEXT
OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS. WE ARE SPEAKING OF STRATE-
GIC ARMS STRIKING STRATEGIC TARGETS. IF THE SIDES ARE IN
AGREEMENT ON THIS, PERHAPS THEY COULD MOVE FORWARD ON THIS
BASIS.

16. IN POST-PLENARY BILATERAL WITH DR. JOHNSON ON MARCH 30,
SHCHUKIN REITERATED MANY OF THE ABOVE POINTS INCLUDING HIS
STATEMENTS REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF CRUISE MISSILE
RANGE LIMITATIONS TO STRATEGIC, VICE TACTICAL, CRUISE
MISSILES. EARLE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MISSILE RANGES, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978GENEVA05101
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: DG ALTERED
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780147-0326
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA USSALTTWO
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780491/aaaaczgc.tel
Line Count: 243
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 75fe7cb6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 jun 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3071744
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: HIGHLIGHTS OF POST- LENARY DISCUSSIONS WITH ACADEMICIAN SHCHUKIN REGARDING CRUISE MISSILE RANGE, MARCH 23 AND MARCH 30, 1978
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/75fe7cb6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014